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ABSTRACT
The World Trade Organization's ('WTO") Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") promised to standardize world-wide intellectual property rights (IPR)
enforcement procedures, and thus, facilitate trade and commerce between member nations.
However, the TRIPS implementation transition of many less developed and developing nations has
resulted in a much lower IPR enforcement standard than the drafters of TRIPS envisioned. This,
coupled with increased world-wide trade in counterfeit goods, has created friction between the
developing nations with lower IPR enforcement and the developed nations with higher IPR
enforcement. Consequently, many nations, including the United States, have entered into Free
Trade Agreements ("FTA") to further raise the IPR enforcement standards that TRIPS laid out.
Nonetheless, there are still concerns with the new FTAs, most importantly, with training the many
different customs officials to recognize the multitude of IPR violations. Not until customs and other
enforcement officials realize that the protection of IPR brings value and stability to their economies,
will there be an adequate standardized system of IPR enforcement.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: A REALITY GAP (INSUFFICIENT
ASSISTANCE, INEFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION)?
TIMOTHY P. TRAINER*

INTRODUCTION

The World Trade Organization's ("WTO") Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS")1 held the promise of great strides in the
ability to protect and enforce intellectual property. 2 From a strict enforcement
perspective, the TRIPS provisions addressing requirements for civil, criminal, and
border enforcement 3 procedures were major strides forward because they required
national laws to include some basic provisions regarding civil enforcement of
intellectual property, actions to stop the importation of certain infringing goods, and
imposition of criminal penalties for certain violations of intellectual property rights
("IPR").4

The combination of evolving and increased trade in counterfeit and pirate goods
and experience with the implementation of the TRIPS requirements have exposed
the fact that the manufacturers and distributors of infringing goods are creative and
that TRIPS may suffer from vagueness and ambiguity resulting in less than effective
IPR enforcement. 5 The experience of companies and governments in addressing IPR
violations has resulted in a trend among some members of the WTO to raise the
*Mr. Trainer's intellectual property background includes work at the U.S. Customs Service's
IPR Branch, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Office of Legislative and International Affairs,
private practice and past president of the Washington, D.C.-based International AntiCounterfeiting
Coalition. In 2005, he established the Global Intellectual Property Strategy Center, P.C., in
Washington, D.C. and has done short-term projects for the State Department, World Bank and
organizations under U.S. AID projects. He has been teaching as an adjunct professor at American
University's Washington College of Law since 2005.
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.int/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-TRIPS.pdf.
2 See generally id.(attempting to reduce distortions in international trade by promoting the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights).
3 Id. arts. 41-61.
4 Id. art. 1.1; see, e.g., id.arts. 41.1 (civil enforcement), 44.1 (injunction to prevent imports), 61
(criminal penalties).
5 Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement.* The Case
for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 386-87 (1998) (describing that
opposing countries may each interpret vague terms in the TRIPS Agreement in their own favor);
Doris Estelle Long, 'Democratizing" Globalization. Practicingthe Policies of CulturalInclusion, 10

CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 264 (2002) (suggesting that the "ambiguity in TRIPS may be the
result of a desire to 'patch over' differences in an effort to achieve the appearance of agreement");
Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in InternationalRegulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W.

RES. J. INT'L L. 387, 438 (2000) (listing a number of problems resulting from the vague and
ambiguous terms of TRIPS); Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategies for IntellectualProperty and Trade.
The Quest for TRIPS, and Post-TRIPS Strategies, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 79, 104 (2002)
(noting that a number of scholars have pointed out that vagueness, ambiguities, and loopholes are

commonplace in the TRIPS Agreement).
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standards of enforcement beyond the internationally recognized minimum standards
6
established by TRIPS.
Thus, as some WTO members seek aggressive enforcement and negotiate higher
standards of IPR enforcement, "TRIPS-plus" ("TRIPS+"), there are other WTO
members that lag behind in effective implementation of TRIPS requirements, leading
7
to ineffective IPR enforcement as perceived by some IPR owners and governments.
As a result, friction has been created between governments seeking the so-called
TRIPS+ enforcement standards and other governments that are willing to implement
TRIPS level enforcement, but resist enforcement standards above the TRIPS
8
minimum standards.
In the following pages, this article will identify some select provisions of TRIPS
and how TRIPS provisions can contribute to confusion concerning implementation of
these minimum standards and why there is a trend among some WTO members to
heighten enforcement standards. In addition, an attempt will be made to explain
why there may be resistance to heightened standards. In an effort to highlight some
of these problems, the article will rely on the TRIPS border measures provisions, but
not exclusively, as the bases for discussion. Finally, the article will address briefly
some IPR-related training and education issues that arise from the enforcement
focus.

I. TRIPS:

PROMISE V. PRACTICE

At the outset, it is necessary to understand that not all WTO members were
required to bring the enforcement provisions to life at the same time. 9 TRIPS, Part
VI, contained transition periods for developed, developing, and least developed
countries so that governments would have time to amend national laws and
implement the new requirements. 10 Moreover, governments could self-designate the
6 Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 867-68 (2007)
(describing TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-extra agreements).
7 Brook K. Baker, Artirtic Flexibiity for Acce'sing Medicines:
Analysis of WTO Action
RegardingParagraph6 of the DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 622-23 (2004) (noting how the United States has threatened some
developing countries for failing to grant TRIPS-plus rights to patent holders).
8 Id.
9 TRIPS Agreement arts. 65-66.
10

d.

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, no Member shall be obliged
to apply the provisions of this Agreement before the expiry of a general period of
one year following the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
2. A developing country Member is entitled to delay for a further period of four
years the date of application, as defined in paragraph 1, of the provisions of this
Agreement other than Articles 3, 4 and 5.
3. Any other Member which is in the process of transformation from a centrallyplanned into a market, free-enterprise economy and which is undertaking
structural reform of its intellectual property system and facing special problems
in the preparation and implementation of intellectual property laws and
regulations, may also benefit from a period of delay as foreseen in paragraph 2.
4. To the extent that a developing country Member is obliged by this Agreement
to extend product patent protection to areas of technology not so protectable in its
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group into which they belonged: developed, developing, or least developed. 1 Based
on the language of Article 65.1, developed countries such as the United States,
Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and others were expected to apply the
provisions as of January 1996, which was a year after entry into force of the WTO
agreement. 12 Accordingly, developing countries, having an additional four years, had
a total of five years for their transition period. 13
In part, the transition periods were meant to provide governments with time to
amend and incorporate necessary provisions into national law, but also to train and
educate relevant government officials about new tasks, missions, and obligations. 14
WTO members anticipated the need for training and education as evidenced by the
TRIPS provision regarding technical cooperation. 15 It is important to note that
Article 67 states:

territory on the general date of application of this Agreement for that Member, as
defined in paragraph 2, it may delay the application of the provisions on product
patents of Section 5 of Part 11 to such areas of technology for an additional period
of five years.
5. A Member availing itself of a transitional period under paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4
shall ensure that any changes in its laws, regulations and practice made during
that period do not result in a lesser degree of consistency with the provisions of
this Agreement.
Id. art. 65.
1. In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country
Members, their economic, financial and administrative constraints, and their need
for flexibility to create a viable technological base, such Members shall not be
required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5,
for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under paragraph 1
of Article 65. The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a leastdeveloped country Member, accord extensions of this period.
2.
Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them
to create a sound and viable technological base.
Id. art. 66.
11Id.; see also Michael S. Mireles, The Bayh -DoleAct and Incentives for the Commercialization
of Government-FundedInvention in Developing Countries,76 UMKC L. REV. 525, 525 n.3 (2007)
(stating that "there is no universal definition of what constitutes 'developed' or 'developing'
country").
12 Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
3,
Apr.
15
1994,
33 I.L.M.
1125
(1994)
[hereinafter
Final Act],
available at
http://www.wto.int/english/docs-e/legal-e/03-fa.pdf.
3.
The representatives agree on the desirability of acceptance of the WTO
Agreement by all participants in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (hereinafter referred to as "participants") with a view to its entry
into force by 1 January 1995, or as early as possible thereafter. Not later than late
1994, Ministers will meet, in accordance with the final paragraph of the Punta del
Este Ministerial Declaration, to decide on the international implementation of the
results, including the timing of their entry into force.
Id.
13 TRIPS Agreement art. 65.2.
14 Id. art. 67.
15 Id.
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In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed
country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms
and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing
and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation shall include
assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the prevention of
their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or
reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters,
including the training of personnel. 16
In simple terms, the promise of the TRIPS enforcement provisions in Articles 41
through 61 is that WTO members would have established effective IPR enforcement
systems so that owners of the various forms of IPR covered by TRIPS would, at the
very least, have more effective procedures in place for civil enforcement of IPR.
Additionally, copyright and trademark owners would be able to rely on new and
improved measures to stop importation of infringing goods and have criminal
remedies available to punish counterfeiters and pirates.
By 2008, the transition periods with regard to the enforcement provisions have
expired 17 and WTO members should be providing the level of protection and
enforcement that TRIPS outlines in Articles 41-61. Generally, national laws have
been amended to incorporate the changes necessary.18
Regarding actual
implementation and how governments are affording IPR owners with protection and
enforcement, there are no WTO panel decisions at the time of this writing to provide
insight into how TRIPS enforcement provisions are interpreted. 19 Countries have

16Id.

(emphasis added).
Id. art. 66.1.
18 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Sweden-Measures Affecting Enforcement of
IntellectualPropertyRights, WT/DS86/2 (Dec. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Sweden-Solution]. In 1997, the
United States initiated consultations with Denmark and Sweden because their national laws failed
to provide IPR owners with the possibility of obtaining provisional measures for the protection of
IPR in accordance with TRIPS, Article 59.
Id.; Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution,
Denmark-MeasuresAffecting Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS83/2 (June 13,
2001) [hereinafter Denmark-Solution].
Both cases were resolved without the need for full
proceedings under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Sweden-Solution, supra;
Denmark-Solution, supra.
19Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities-Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs,WT/DS124/2 (Mar. 26,
2001) [hereinafter Eur. Cmtys.-Solution]; Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, GreeceEnforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs,
WT/DS125/2 (Mar. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Greece-Solution]. U.S. v. European Union and U.S. v.
Greece, respectively, dealt with Greece's failure to provide enforcement as required under Articles
41 and 61. Eur. Cmtys.-Solution, supra; Greece-Solution, supra. The parties reached agreement in
March 2001. Eur. Cmtys.-Solution, supra; Greece-Solution, supra. The U.S. case against China
raises several enforcement issues, including the U.S. challenge to China's thresholds to trigger
criminal cases of counterfeiting and piracy and the manner of disposition of infringing goods that
China customs seizes for infringement. Request for Consultations by the United States, ChinaMeasures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, pt. II,
WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2001) [hereinafter China-Solution]. Thus, the U.S. v. China case has the
potential of significant enforcement implications in practice in many countries. See id.
17
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attempted to do the best they can to come into compliance based on their
understanding of the TRIPS text.20
Without looking at every Article of TRIPS Part JJJ,21 it is worth examining a
sampling of Part III, because of the challenges raised by the text and why some WTO
Member States have problems in effective implementation. 22 Article 41.1 sets forth
ambitious goals for IPR enforcement. It states that
Members shall ensure that enforeement proeeduresas specified in this Part
are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act
of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies
which eonstitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures
shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to
23
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.
An examination of the TRIPS text must be read with many interests in mind.
First, how do the various Member States interpret these words? For Member States
that have little or no IPR enforcement experience, what do some of these phrases
mean and how will they be implemented? From the perspective of IPR owners,
specifically, multinational companies, this provision and its lofty goals, albeit general
in nature, gives corporate IPR owners expectations as to what they will receive in
markets around the world. 24 Thus, for the IPR owner, there appears to be the
promise of an improved IPR environment. 25
But, Article 41 contains a provision that should temper IPR owners'
expectations.
Article 41.5 reflects the difficulty of negotiating aggressive
enforcement provisions without compromise. The negotiators seeking aggressive IPR
enforcement provisions must also acknowledge that the TRIPS enforcement
provisions are new for many countries and may be beyond the capabilities of many

20 See, e.g., China-Solution, supra note 19, pt. III (discussing the attempts of China to come
into compliance with certain TRIPS articles).
21 TRIPS Agreement arts. 51-60; see gene-rally TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS,
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS (Thomson-West 2008) (providing

an in depth article-by-article discussion about TRIPS, Part III, Section 4 regarding border
measures).
22 While much can be said and debated about the motives of some governments, this discussion
will focus strictly on the text and the issues raised by the text itself.
23 TRIPS Agreement art 41.1 (emphasis added).
24 See Timothy P. Trainer, IP Enforcement." Agreements, Expectations,and Frustrations, 19
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REPORT 12 (2005),

http://pubs.bna.com/NWSSTND/IP/BNA/wipr.nsf/SearchAllView/FC1 7D3DC43A484FC852570C7006
0170E?Open&highlight=IP,ENFORCEMENT:,AGREEMENTS (raising issues with TRIPS, while
addressing the possibly unrealistic expectations as more free trade agreements are negotiated and
concluded).
25 See TRIPS Agreement ("Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights
do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade ....
").
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Member States in the short or medium term. 26 Thus, the question should be asked
as to whether Article 41.5 undermines the very things Part 111 is supposed to provide.
Article 41.5 states that
It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place
a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct
from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the
capacity of Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part
creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as
between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of
law in general.27
One can understand that no government is required to establish a separate
judicial system for IPR, but the last sentence raises an interesting question: If a
Member State has no resources dedicated to IPR enforcement, does this mean that
once its TRIPS obligations are triggered the Member State is complying with its
enforcement obligations by having no resources for IPR enforcement? This issue has
not been the subject of any WTO Dispute Settlement case. Thus, until there is a
need to obtain an official interpretation, it remains to be seen what Article 41.5
means in practice. Nevertheless, IPR owners are left to wonder what the last
sentence means with regard to enforcement, in general, under any national IPR
enforcement system if laws are changed to provide for enforcement, but no human
resources are provided to take the actions necessary for enforcement at the border or
for IPR crimes that require the involvement of law enforcement, prosecutors, and
judges.
In the area of border measures, Article 51 creates numerous challenges for
Member States that have no pre-TRIPS border enforcement experience. 28 The
Article states that
Members sbha], in conformity with the provisions set out below, adopt
procedures to enable a right holder, who has valid grounds for suspecting
that the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods
may take place, to lodge an application in writing with competent
authorities, administrative or judicial, for the suspension by the customs
authorities of the release into free circulation of such goods. Members may
enable such an application to be made in respect of goods which involve
other infringements of intellectual property rights, provided that the
requirements of this Section are met. Members may also provide for
corresponding procedures concerning the suspension by the customs

26 Roberto Garza Barbosa, Revisiting Intornational Copyright Law, 8 BARRY L. REV. 43, 73
(2007) (noting that developing countries cannot be expected to change their entire legal systems
simply to bring themselves into compliance with TRIPS).
27 TRIPS Agreement
28 Id. art. 51.

art. 41.5.
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authorities of the release of infringing goods destined for exportation from
29
their territories.
This provision promises IPR owners that all WTO Member States must have a
system that will permit copyright and trademark owners to apply for protection
against pirate and counterfeit products that are being imported.3 0 At first glance, a
WTO Member State is confronted by a number of unanswered questions such as:
1. What authorities within the government could be the competent
authority for purposes of Article 51?
a. Customs?
b. Ministry of Trade and Industry (a parent ministry for the
government's trademark office)?31

c. Trademark Office?
d. Copyright Office?
e. Ministry of Culture (in some governments, the Ministry of Culture is
the parent Ministry for copyrights)?32
f. Any other government agency that is selected?
2. Should the application that is lodged for border measures have national
effect or will the copyright or trademark owner have to apply for protection
at each port of entry in the country?
3. What constitutes valid grounds for suspecting that an importation of
infringing goods may take place?
The answers are enough to cause much confusion for a government not
experienced in IPR enforcement. Basically, a Member State could designate any
court or government agency as the competent authority to receive an application for
border enforcement. 33 This may, in fact, be too much flexibility. An IPR owner that

21)Id.

30

(emphasis added).

Id. In addition to copyrights and trademarks, TRIPS covers geographical indications,

industrial designs, patents, lay-out designs of integrated circuits, undisclosed information and anticompetitive practices in licensing. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 9-40.
31 See,
e.g.,
Japan
Ministry
of
Economy,
Trade,
and
Industry,
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008). Japan's Ministry of Economy,
Trade, and Industry, is the parent ministry for the Japan Patent Office that also includes the
administration of trademark functions. See Organization Chart of the Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry,
http://www.meti.go.jp/englisl/aboutmeti/data/aOrganizatione/2007/organization-chart.html
(last

visited Oct. 26, 2008).
'32See, e.g., Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright, No. 83(1) (2003) (Slovk.); Ministry of
Culture of the Slovak Republic, http://www.culture.gov.sk/en/ministry (last visited Oct. 26, 2008)
(explaining that the Slovak Republic's Ministry of Culture's mission includes the administration of
copyright law); Ministry of Culture of Lithuania, http://www.muza.lt/go.php/lit/English (last visited
Oct. 13, 2008) (explaining that Lithuania's Ministry of Culture is also responsible for copyright
protection).
33 TRIPS Agreement art. 51.

[8:1 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

operates commercially in many countries is faced with the challenge of determining
34
who the competent authorities are in every country where it operates.
Here are a few examples of the challenges for IPR owners. A company that
wants to file an application for border measures in the United States would file with
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 35 In Canada, the IPR owner must apply to a
court for border measures and must also notify the Minister of Public Safety. 36 In
Egypt, it appears that the IPR owner must file with Egyptian Customs, 3 7 but these
regulations appear to require that the IPR owner also file the complaint with the
Trade Agreements Sector of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry,38 thus
raising the question which agency is the "real" competent authority.
In addition, nothing in TRIPS, Article 51, prohibits a Member State from
imposing on IPR owners the requirement to file multiple applications at multiple
Customs ports of entry within the country. 3 9 In 2002, one U.S.-based trade
association, representing dozens of multinational companies, filed comments to the
Office of the United States Trade Representative complaining of onerous application
40
filing requirements in order to obtain nationwide border enforcement in Japan.
The possible "prohibition" against onerous application requirements may be to argue
that TRIPS' General Obligations regarding enforcement states that procedures
concerning enforcement shall be "fair" and "shall not be unnecessarily complicated or
costly." 41 While this argument may be a good argument, there has not been a WTO
dispute settlement case involving the issue of application procedures related to
having nationwide effect.
The third point raised above with regard to having valid grounds for suspecting
an importation of infringing goods is also an issue that has not been the subject of a
WTO dispute settlement case. Thus, a WTO Member State could deny an application
for border measures because of an IPR owner's lack of any grounds to suspect that
infringing goods will be imported. 42 In order to have any understanding of what
"valid grounds" might mean, it is helpful to look at TRIPS Article 52 for additional
information regarding the application for border measures. Article 52 states that the
IPR owner initiating the application procedures for border measures "shall be
required to provide adequate evidence to satisfy the competent authorities
that ...

there is prima facie an infringement of the right holder's

intellectual

34 Cf Jeffery Latik & Hans Henrik Lidgard, EmbracingPrice Dierimination: TRIPS and the
Suppression of ParallelTrade in Pharmaceuticals,27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1043, 1073-74 (2006)

(discussing international trade in pharmaceutical products in comparison to IP rights enforcement).
3, 19 C.F.R. § 133.0 (2007).
'36Memorandum D 19-4-3 from the Can. Border Servs. Agency on Copyrights and Trademarks
2 (June 17, 2008), available athttp://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/dm-md/dl9/dl9-4-3eng.pdf.
37 Executive Regulation to Implement Import and Export Law, No. 118/1975 (2005) (Egypt),
available at http ://www.eu-delegation.org.eg/en/EUEgyptTrade issues/Docs/IlEgypt/Ministerial%/o20Decree%/o2ONo.%/o20770-2005.pdf.
38 Id. art 33.
'3 See TRIPS Agreement art. 51.
40 Submission of the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, Inc., to the United States
Trade Representative:
Special 301 Recommendations 10 (February 14, 2002), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2002/2002-Special-301-Report/
asset upload file567_6367.pdf.
41 TRIPS Agreement art. 41.2.
42 Id.art 41.1.
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property right.
...
43 The interaction between Articles 51 and 52 concerning the
"valid grounds" related to "prima facie" raise another set of problems for IPR owners
because of Article 52's additional requirement that the IPR owner provide a
"sufficiently detailed description of the goods to make them readily recognizable by
44
the customs authorities."
The inter-relationship between Articles 51 and 52 regarding required
information submitted by an IPR owner raises questions regarding the specificity of
information about the infringing goods that is necessary for an application to be
accepted. How will the IPR owner know what goods will be imported that infringes
its copyright or trademark? If too much specificity is required, it will render the
procedures meaningless and, in practice, few, if any, IPR owners would be able to get
any protection at the border.
TRIPS' only criminal IPR enforcement provision is another example of raising
expectations among IPR owners that governments would begin to initiate criminal
enforcement through police actions and prosecutions of trademark counterfeiters and
copyright pirates. From a government perspective, the provision includes a few
ambiguous terms and created confusion for Member States that have little or no
experience in IPR enforcement, attempting to understand the Agreement's
requirements. Article 61 states
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied
at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a
commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or
monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level
of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate
cases, remedies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and
destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the
predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence.
Members may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in
other cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular
45
where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.
Just a few of the questions raised by Article 61 are:
1. How does the Member State determine "commercial scale" counterfeiting
or piracy?
2. What level of fine or term of imprisonment will deter this type of
conduct?
3. For purposes of establishing penalties, what other crimes are of a
corresponding gravity to counterfeiting and piracy?
4. What is meant by "In appropriateeases, remedies available shall
include ....?

43Id. art. 52 (emphasis added).
44 ITd.
45Id. art. 61.
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The implementation of the words in Article 61 into law and practice is based on
what each Member State deems appropriate in its country. 46 Thus, Member States
that had never before enforced IPR through criminal laws were confronting a wholly
new type of crime requiring the government's involvement. Perhaps fortunate for
many Member States, no specific manner of implementation is non-compliant until a
dispute settlement case arises and a panel rules that a particular practice is noncompliant. 47 At present, the U.S.-China case has placed some Article 61-related
issues before a WTO Dispute Settlement panel, but there is no ruling as of the time
of this writing. 48
Based on this superficial examination of a few TRIPS enforcement provisions, it
becomes clearer that the TRIPS enforcement text provided little more than a bullet
point list of required elements for an IPR enforcement system. Translating these
required elements into practice was and continues to be a major challenge. The
implementation challenge was supposedly addressed by Article 67 ("Technical
49
Cooperation") including the previously mentioned provision on technical assistance.

II. TRIPS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE-HIGH DEMAND, LIMITED RESOURCES
One early development regarding technical and legal assistance was an
agreement between two Geneva-based intergovernmental organizations: the WTO
and the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").5
On December 22,
1995, the organizations concluded the agreement for cooperation that would formally
provide for WIPO to be involved in providing assistance in IPR. 5 1 Despite this
agreement, however, neither WIPO nor WTO had the staff to deliver enforcement
52
training simply because IPR enforcement was not the mission of the organizations.
Thus, the technical assistance provision of TRIPS 53 is critical to any degree of
success in the implementation of the enforcement provisions and delivering the
promise of effective enforcement to the IPR owners expecting an improved
commercial environment around the world. But, in order to understand the reality of
what the developed countries could do in the area of technical assistance, it may be

46

Id. art. 1.1.

47Id.art. 68.

Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members
the opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights. It shall carry out such other responsibilities as
assigned to it by the Members, and it shall, in particular, provide any assistance
requested by them in the context of dispute settlement procedures.

Id.
China-Solution, supra note 19.
49 TRIPS Agreement art. 67.
50Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade
Organization, WIPO-WTO, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754.
51Id. art. 4.
52 See id.pmbl (stating that the desire of the agreement was to establish a mutually supportive
relationship).
5 TRIPS Agreement art. 67.
48
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worth reviewing the resources available to one U.S. Government agency in the early
and mid 1990s.5

4

The TRIPS border measures raised a number of issues related to government
actions that would be necessary to provide effective enforcement. Given the new and
significant development of border enforcement, 55 this is one area in which many
governments would need assistance.
Many may view the U.S. IPR border
enforcement system as an old fixture of Customs enforcement, 56 but the heightened
focus of a more aggressive and "advanced" system is a relatively recent
development. 57 A Customs IPR Task Force was formed in the 1988-1989 time
frame 58 and included three Customs attorneys when the IPR Task Force became a
59
formal "Branch" within Customs' Office of Regulations and Rulings in 1991.
51This discussion is based upon actual experience in providing IPR technical assistance while
working at two U.S. Government agencies, U.S. Customs Service between 1988-1993 and the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office between 1996-1999.
55 TRIPS Agreement arts. 51-60.
56 Use of the Term Ping Pong, 13 Cust. B. & Dec. 1015 (Dep't of Treas. June 15, 1978). The
basic laws enforced by Customs against the importation of infringing goods have been in place for
many years. See, e.g., id. One can find Customs administrative infringement rulings dating back to
1978. See id. (ruling that imported products must not bear a mark that copies or simulates a
registered trademark already recorded with Customs); see also Whether Toy Dog Skins and Stuffed
Toy Dogs Are Substantially Similar to Copyrighted Cartoon Dog, 13 Cust. B. & Dec. 1334 (Dep't of
Treas. Nov. 16, 1978) (ruling that imported stuffed toy dogs infringed a copyright already recorded
with Customs).
F7See TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 21, § 1:2 (stating that while U.S. IPR enforcement has
been around for many decades, the increased IPR enforcement priority was instituted in the late
1980s).
58 See Enforcement of Production of Semiconductor Chip Products: Patent Surveys, 54 Fed.
Reg. 40,882 (proposed Oct. 4, 1989) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pts. 12, 24, 133) [hereinafter
Semiconductor-Enforcement] (referencing the submission of comments to the Customs Intellectual
Property Rights Task Force).
59 See "Knott's Berry Farm", 56 Fed. Reg. 2064 (Dep't of Treas. Jan. 18, 1991) (recognizing the
change from "Task Force" to "Branch" because of the reference to the "Intellectual Property Rights
Branch"); see also Reorganization of the Office of Regulations and Rulings, 56 Fed. Reg. 41,159
(Dep't of Treas. Aug. 19, 1991) [hereinafter Reorganization-Notice] (providing the public with
information regarding the divisions and branches within the Office of Regulations and Rulings).
The reorganization notice identified the Intellectual Property Rights Branch and described the
Branch's mission as:
Issuing decisions and formulating policy and regulations to ensure the protection
of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) which encompass trademarks,
tradenames, copyrights, patents and trade dress; coordinating the identification of
legislative requirements for modernizing, clarifying and strengthening Customs
statutory authority in the IPR area; informing the public, principally through
existing trade associations and other industry groups, of Customs interest in
identifying unfair trade practices and of Customs ability to assist in protecting
intellectual property rights; recordation of trademarks, tradenames and
copyrights in order to protect against imports which constitute infringement;
implementation of exclusion orders issued by the ITC and patent surveys, as a
means of protecting patent owners against infringement; resolving issues
concerning the entry of restricted or prohibited merchandise, including the
importation of seditious, treasonable, obscene or immoral materials; and issuing
decisions and guidance concerning the importation or exportation of cultural
property, including pre-Columbian art and artifacts and items subject to the
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Property.
Reorganization-Notice, supra.
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The enhanced U.S. Customs IPR program predates the implementation of
TRIPS obligations by only a handful of years. 60 At the time of the formal creation of
the IPR Branch, the Branch consisted of only three attorneys, one paralegal and an
administrative assistant. 61 In total, only five people were dedicated full time to
IPR. 62 In the description of the IPR Branch's responsibilities published in the
Federal Register, one significant role of the Branch is not mentioned: training U.S.
Customs officers about Customs regulations, their application to shipments
containing suspect goods and the basic forms of intellectual property that are to be
protected. 63 At the outset, before one begins to consider training of foreign officials,
the IPR Task Force had to acquaint U.S. Customs officials about procedures under
64
U.S. regulations and laws.
Thus, in the early 1990s during the same period that negotiators were debating
the TRIPS text, U.S. Customs' enhanced IPR enforcement program was still in its
early stages. Nevertheless, the few years of experience that U.S. Customs gained
between 1989 and 1996, the year in which TRIPS obligations went into effect for
developed countries, provided the agency with a small corps of lawyers, inspectors,
and agents who gained experience in IPR border enforcement cases.
The reality is that this small corps of U.S. Customs officials would never be
65
sufficient to provide the technical assistance needed in many Member States.
Assuming that the U.S. had one of the most active IPR border enforcement systems
in the world as of January 1, 1996, and the staff dedicated solely to IPR enforcement
could be counted on two hands, it should not have been a surprise that the global
expertise available in the developed countries would never be adequate to prepare
scores of developing and least developed countries to both amend laws and to train
foreign officials to carry out the daily enforcement activities needed to make a TRIPS
border enforcement system function effectively. 66 In hindsight, if one considers the
time and resource commitment that was required to train U.S. Customs officials, it

60 Compare Semiconductor-Enforcement, supra note 58 (stating that the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act was approved by Congress on September 28, 1989), with 19 U.S.C. § 3511(a), (d)(15)
(2006) (stating that TRIPS was implemented by Congress on September 27, 1994).
61TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 21, § 1:2 n.3.
(32
Id.
(3Id. § 1:2 (stating that the internal training program is what required the IPR task force to
provide instruction to foreign customs officials).
(34
Id.

(5Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37
IDEA 491, 543 (1997); WTO, Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.int/englisb/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6e.htm (last visited
Oct.
13,
2008)
[hereinafter Current WTO Signatories] (stating that there are currently 153 different GATT
signatories). The original 128 governments that had signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ('GATT') were officially known as "GATT contracting parties." WTO, 1994 GATT Signatories,
http://www.wto.int/english/thewto e/gattmem e.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2008). "On 1 January
1995, the WTO replaced GATT, which had been in existence since 1947, as the organization
overseeing the multilateral trading system." Id. "Upon signing the new WTO agreements (which
include the updated GATT, known as GATT 1994), they officially became known as 'WTO
members."' Id. As of this writing, there are 153 WTO members. Current WTO Signatories, supra.

(36
See Kirsten M. Koepsel, How Do Developed CountriesMoot Their Obligations UnderArticle
67 of the TRIPS Agreement?, 44 IDEA 167, 174 (2004) (discussing the extensive assistance that
developed countries would need to provide developing countries or less developed countries).
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should have been more obvious that it would be unlikely that effective enforcement
67
would be provided by developing and least developed countries "on time.'
Indeed, the "team" of globe traveling technical assistance providers during the
first transition period (1996-2000) that was for the benefit of developing countries
was a small cadre of people often known to each other. 68 A similar training challenge
existed for criminal enforcement of IPR. 69 The new reality was that governments
that had never criminalized IPR violations were now required to establish a new set
of crimes and needed law enforcement to become familiar with the various forms of
IPR and how to identify a possible IPR crime.7 0
Thus, the TRIPS criminal
enforcement requirements added to the scope of enforcement falling within the
jurisdiction of the police, prosecutors and the courts.
The challenges of limited resources available to be deployed for technical
assistance in the area of criminal IPR enforcement were and continue to be similar to
that relating to border enforcement.7 1 In view of the fact that the TRIPS Article 61
requirement to adopt criminal procedures for copyright and trademark violations was
new to many Member States, it is likely that criminal investigations and
prosecutions for IPR crimes were not numerous around the world prior to
implementation of the TRIPS provision.7 2 In the United States, the U.S. Department
of Justice's Annual Reports indicate that, by comparison, in fiscal years 1997, 1998
and 2007, 7 3 the number of criminal copyright and trademark cases filed were 100, 97,
74
and 200, respectively.
In general, reflecting back on a decade of efforts to assist governments in
meeting their respective IPR enforcement obligations, it is somewhat safe to say that
negotiating the TRIPS text was easier than the ongoing effort to try and create an
effective global IPR enforcement system country-by-country. If statistics and the
volume of complaints are any indication, the multilateral effort to create enforcement
67Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Rules, No. 47.1 (2007) (India) (allowing for the
maximum transition periods in Articles 65 and 66, India's new border enforcement provisions went
into effect after the expiration of the transition periods). The Indian implementing instructions
regarding the new IPR border enforcement rules were issued in October 2007. See Letter from P. S.
Pruthi, Commissioner, Central Board of Excise & Customs, to Chief Commissioners of Customs et.
al. (Oct. 29, 2007), avainbale at, http://www.ebee.gov.in/customs/es-circulars/es-circulars07/cir41l2k7-cus.htm (discussing the Indian Implementation Instructions).
(38
See TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 21, § 1:2 (discussing the educational nature of the IPR
branch attorneys when they dealt with Customs officials).
69 Mark Wu, Intellectual Property Rights In Global Trade Framework.* IP Trends In
Developing Countries,98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 95, 103 (2004).
70 TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
71TOM PENGELLY, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
th
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES 2 (11

ed. 2005).
72 TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
73 1997 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 1 n.1; 1998 ATTlY GEN. ANN. REP. 1 n.1; 2007 ATT'Y GEN. ANN.
REP. III-1. The U.S. Federal Government's fiscal years run from October 1 to September 30. See
1997 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 1 n.1. Fiscal year 1997 would be from October 1, 1996, to September 30,
1997. Id.
74

1997 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 90; 1998 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. B-6; 2007 ATTY GEN. ANN. REP.

F-4; see alsoUSDOJ: Office of the Attorney General-Annual Reports,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008). Each annual report,
beginning from 1997, has a statistical summary of IPR cases. See, e.g., 1998 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP.
B-1.
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"standards" has not had the effect that many may have expected in view of the
volume of trade in infringing goods. 75
The European Commission's official
statements reference a growing, not lessening, threat posed by counterfeit and
pirated products. 76 U.S. Customs and Border Protection's May 2008 IPR overview
also references a growing problem in counterfeit and pirate products. 77 The World
Customs Organization has also stated that the negative impact of counterfeit goods
on the global economy is growing every year.7 8 There are also dozens of industry
groups that have created special programs and initiatives on IPR enforcement,
including the International Chamber of Commerce's Business Action to Stop
Counterfeiting and Piracy ("BASCAP") that believes that IPR theft is "spiraling out
of control."

79

A vast majority of today's 153 WTO Member States and a number of others that
are in the process of joining the WTO need technical assistance.8 0 Today's army of
assistance providers has expanded to include government experts from WTO Member
States, intergovernmental organizations, companies, industry groups, and others.
Despite the expanded group of people who may be involved in providing training,
generally, most of the assistance programs consist of a few days or a week of
workshops, seminars and lectures, rather than the exception of long-term, on the
ground programs.8 1 The reality is that practically everyone involved in providing the
needed assistance is diverted from his or her "real" job in order to participate in
delivering the training, which limits the amount of time available for training.
One conclusion that can be drawn from the experiences of the past dozen years
is that the technical assistance needs were not fully considered.8 2 The inadequacies
75Compare Yearly Comparisons:
Seizure Statistics for Intellectual Property Rights,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/prioritytrade/ipr/seizure/seizure stats.xml (last visited Oct. 26,
2008) (stating the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's annual seizure statistics), with Eur.
Comm'n for Tax & Custs. Union, Report on the Community Customs Activities on Counterfeit
Piracy:
Results
at
the
European Border
at
7-8
(2007),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/resources/documents/customs/customs- controls/counterfeit-pir
acy/statistics2007.pdf (stating the European Community's Customs IPR seizure statistics by country
and products).
76 See European Commission, Counterfeiting and Piracy,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/customs/customs-controls/counterfeit-piracy/combating/index
en.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
77 See U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Intellectual Property Rights Overview,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/trade/ipr-fact-sheets/ipr-facts overview.xml (last
visited Oct. 26, 2008).
78 WCO Protection of Intellectual Property Rights,
http://www.wcoomd.org/home-wco-topics-epoverviewboxes-responsibilities-epipr.htm
(last visited
Oct. 26, 2008).
79Int'l
Chamber
of Commerce,
World
Business
Organization
& BASCAP,
http://www.iccwbo.org/bascap/id883/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
80See Yu, supra note 6, at 888-89 (stating that TRIPS does not guarantee technical assistance
to less developed countries).
SI See U.S. Dept. of State, Intellectual Property Training
Programs Funded,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/sep/92653.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2007). In September 2007,
the U.S. State Department announced funding for a number of programs, including a program for
Indonesia for two full-time U.S. senior technical advisors to assist Indonesia in implementing new
optical disc anti-piracy laws. Id.
82 See Yu, supra note 6, at 888-89 (stating that TRIPS does not guarantee technical assistance
to less developed countries).
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regarding funding and human resources dedicated to training and education 83 reflect
the lack of priority on these issues at the time of negotiations. The result has been
84
an increasingly visible tension over IPR enforcement in many countries.

III. U.S. FTAs: RAISING THE ENFORCEMENT BAR-RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES
In the absence of any new global multilateral trade agreement in recent years,
governments around the world have engaged in negotiating free trade agreements
("FTA") or economic partnership agreements ("EPA") in order to improve trade
relations for mutual trade benefits. 85 The FTAs and EPAs have often included IPR,
which has resulted in some effort to strengthen enforcement provisions. 6 The
following discussion will reference primarily the FTAs concluded between the United
States and its trading partners to illustrate some trends based upon what has been
learned by operating under the TRIPS IPR enforcement provisions.
In the post-TRIPS period, i.e., since the implementation date of the TRIPS
obligations, the United States has concluded numerous FTAs.87 In many of these
FTAs, the United States has undertaken efforts to eliminate ambiguities in the
TRIPS enforcement provisions and to raise the enforcement standards.88
As
attempted in the discussion above, a few examples of ambiguous or troublesome
TRIPS provisions were provided. Turning to the FTAs, some comparisons will be
provided between the TRIPS text and the FTA texts in order to highlight the effort to
increase the level of IPR enforcement and to clarify TRIPS.
First, it is worth noting that the United States has entered into and concluded
89
FTAs with trading partners whose level of economic development vary broadly.
Nevertheless, the United States has attempted to build upon the TRIPS IPR
enforcement text by negotiating stronger IPR enforcement provisions. 90 Second, it is
important to be aware of the subtle changes from one FTA to another. While many of
the FTA texts may appear similar or identical, it is important to be cognizant of the
fact that FTAs are rarely identical.

8:3PENGELLY, supra note 71, at 2.
84 See, e.g., China-Solution, supra note 19, pt. I (documenting the tension between the U.S. and

China in TRIPS enforcement).
85Nina Rohe, The CentralAmericanFree Trade Agreement-A Survey and Comparison to the
Treaty of the European Community, 12 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 73, 74 (2006).
86 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 102.1(d), Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
8
7Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Intellectual Property,Free Trade Agreements And Economic
Development,
23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 897 (2007);
U.S.
Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Section Index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
88 Susan Scafidi, The "Good Old Days" of TRIPS.* The US. Trade Agenda and the Extension of
PharmaceuticalTest Data Protection,341 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 341, 343 (2004).
89See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World PharmaceuticalTrade And
The Protection Of Pubhlic Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 349 (2005) ([T]he United States has
negotiated various free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing (and developed) countries that
include chapters addressing intellectual property rights.").
90 Sanders, supra note 87, at 897 (discussing inclusion of TRIPS-plus provisions in free trade
agreements and indicating that the United States negotiates high levels of protection for
international intellectual property rights).
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A. US.-JordanFTA
The U.S.-Jordan FTA was concluded in October 2000.91 This was the third FTA
that the United States had concluded. 92 Being one of the early FTAs, the IPR
provisions and its enforcement text are less detailed than more recently concluded
FTAs. The FTA, however, recognizes IPR developments subsequent to the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round that resulted in TRIPS and imposes mutual obligations for
IPR protections. 93 Specifically, trademark owners could expect increased protections
for famous trademarks, 94 patent protections extended to plant varieties, 95 and
copyright owners would have added protections because of the FTA's incorporation of
96
copyright treaties addressing the internet and digital content issues.

In the civil enforcement provisions, the FTA makes clear that "injury to the right
holder shall be based upon the value of the infringed-upon item, according to the
suggested retail price of the legitimate product, or other equivalent measures
established by the right holder for valuing authorized goods." 97 The TRIPS text has
no such specificity regarding the basis for this type of valuation. In addition, the
FTA created a presumption of copyright in favor of the "natural person or legal entity
98
whose name is indicated as the author, producer, performer or publisher of a work,"
which is not in TRIPS.
Concerning border measures and criminal IPR enforcement, the FTA imposed a
requirement that the authorities responsible for border and criminal enforcement be
given the legal authority to undertake enforcement actions against copyright piracy
and trademark counterfeiting without the need for a formal complaint, i.e, ex officio
authority. 99 TRIPS Article 61, dealing with criminal procedures, does not address
this issue as it is silent about a complaint requirement. 10 0 Because Article 61 does
not address the issue of a complaint requirement, WTO Member States have been
free to choose whether or not to impose a complaint requirement in cases involving
criminal piracy and counterfeiting. 101 The FTA text makes clear that the authorities
102
must be empowered to undertake criminal enforcement on their own initiative.
The FTA's requirement that authorities also have ex officio authority to stop the
importation of pirate and counterfeit goods imposes another TRIPS+ requirement.
91 Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art. 19.2, Oct. 24, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 63
[hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA], availableat
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset-upload-file250-5112.pdf.
92 Opinion, Trade Authority," Senate Hands President Timely Victory, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE, May 29, 2002, at B-10; U.S.-Jordan FTA Statistics,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Jordan/SectionIndex.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2008).
93 See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 91, art. 4.1(c)-(d) nn.4-5.
94 Id. art. 4.1(a).
9 Id. art. 4.1(b).
96 Id. art. 4.1(c) -(d).
97 Id. art. 4.24.
98 Id. art. 4.27.
99 Id. art. 4.26.
100 TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
101 Thomas E. Volper, TRIPS Enforcement in China." A Case for Judicial Transparency,33
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 309, 321 (2007) (referencing the bar of certain complaints hinders the
enforcement of TRIPS).
102 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supranote 91, art. 4.26.
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By comparison, TRIPS, Article 51 states that "Members shall ... adopt procedures to
enable a right holder .. .to lodge an application in writing ... for the suspension ...

,,103 The FTA requirement that the authorities must be able to act ex officio
eliminates an absolute application filing requirement. 10 4 In addition, the FTA text
clarifies that the authorities must have ex officio legal authority to act whereas
TRIPS, Article 58 allowed WTO members to choose to give or withhold such legal
powers to the competent authorities responsible for border enforcement. 105
Although the IPR enforcement provisions in the U.S.-Jordan FTA are not as
detailed and extensive as in more recent FTAs, one can see the beginnings of an
effort to raise the TRIPS enforcement standards through the FTA process.

B. US.-Chile FTA
The U.S.-Chile FTA was approved by the U.S. Congress in 2003.106 This FTA
makes major strides in raising IPR enforcement beyond what appears in the U.S.10 7
Jordan FTA and, therefore, includes significant TRIPS+ provisions.
One of the first things attempted to be corrected in the FTA was to improve on
the TRIPS Article 41.5 language regarding the dedication of resources for IPR
enforcement.108 While the FTA recognizes that neither government is required to
establish an IPR focused judicial system or to redistribute resources for IPR
enforcement, the FTA states that neither government is excused from its IPR
enforcement obligations arising from the FTA based on decisions made, or not made,
regarding resource distribution. 10 9 The text improves upon TRIPS Article 41.5 by
clarifying that the enforcement obligations must be met regardless of how the
government decides to dedicate IPR enforcement resources.1 10 In addition, the FTA
makes clear that final decisions on the merits of an IPR case of general application
shall be in writing,11 1 which clarifies the unusual wording in TRIPS that states that
112
decisions on the merits shallpreferablybe in writing.

103

TRIPS Agreement art. 51.

101
U.S.-Jordan FTA, supranote 91, art. 4.26.
105 TRIPS Agreement art. 58 (beginning with "[w]here Members require competent authorities

to act upon their own i nitiativd' (emphasis added)).
106 Compare Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, art. 24.5,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade -Agreements/Bilateral/Chile -FTA/Final -Texts/Section -Index.html
[hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA] (establishing the free trade area on June 6, 2003), with U.S.-Chile FTA
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-77, § 101(a)-(b), 117 Stat. 909, 910-11 (2003) (approving the
U.S.Chile FTA on July 15, 2003 and entering it into force on January 1, 2004).
107 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 106, art. 16.9 ("Desiring to build on the foundations
established in existing international agreements in the field of intellectual property, including the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and affirming the rights and obligations set forth in the TRIPS
Agreement").
108 Compare id. art. 17.11 (requiring a judicial system of enforcement), with TRIPS Agreement
art. 41.5 (requiring no obligation to put a judicial system of enforcement in place).
109 U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 106, art. 17.11.1.
110 Id. art. 17.11.2.
HI Id. art. 17.11.3 (emphasis added).
112 TRIPS Agreement art. 41.3 (emphasis added).
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One interesting difference between the U.S.-Jordan FTA and the U.S.-Chile
FTA, which may be viewed as a retreat by IPR owners, is that the U.S.-Jordan FTA
stated that "injury to the right holder sbhall be based upon the value of the infringedupon item...
but the U.S.-Chile FTA states that "in determining injury to the
right holder, the judicial authorities shall, inter alia, consider the legitimate retail
value of the infringed goods." 114 This is a significant difference in practice as judges
can easily consider something and disregard it. Thus, this provision is one reason for
cautiously reviewing FTAs and keeping in mind that the texts are always negotiated
between the governments and compromises are made in the process.
Another of the many improvements made in the U.S.-Chile FTA is the
requirement that the judicial authorities are required to have the authority to order
an infringer to provide information it may possess regarding others involved in the
infringement activity. 115 Related to the new legal power of the judiciary, the FTA
requires that the judiciary be empowered to impose fines or terms of imprisonment
on infringers who fail to comply with the court's order. 11 6 Interestingly, TRIPS gave
Member States the option of empowering the judiciary in this manner.11 7 Thus, a
WTO Member State that prefers meeting its absolute minimum requirements would
not have changed its law to require that the courts have the power to order disclosure
of information regarding others involved in the infringement and, thereby, limit the
ability to take actions against potentially large infringement operations.
Regarding border measures, several developments are reflected in the U.S.-Chile
FTA. First, language appears in the text to try and prevent onerous and overly
burdensome information requirements imposed on IPR owners seeking border
measures.11 8 As discussed above relating to TRIPS Article 52, the IPR owner is
supposed to provide information that will make the possibly infringing goods readily
recognizable to customs.11 9 But, what does it mean to have information making
possibly infringing goods readily recognizable?
The World Customs Organization ("WCO") attempted to answer the question for
customs agencies when it issued its Model Provisions regarding the implementation
of TRIPS.1 20 In its notes related to IPR owners' applications requesting border
,"113

11 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supranote 91, art. 4.24 (emphasis added).

U.S.Chile FTA, supra note 106, art. 17.11.8(b).
art. 17.11.13 ("In civil judicial proceedings, each Party shall provide that the judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to provide any information the infringer
may have regarding persons involved in the infringement, and regarding the distribution channels
of infringing goods").
H16
Id.
117 TRIPS Agreement art. 47.
118 U.S.Chile FTA, supra note 106, art. 17.11.17 (stating that requirements related to border
measures "shall not unreasonably deter recourse to these procedures").
119 TRIPS Agreement art. 52.
120 World Customs Organization [WCO],
Mode] Provisions for National Legislation to
Implement Fairand Effective Border Measures Consistent With the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights,
at
1
(May
19,
2004),
available at
http://www.wcoipr.org/wcoipr/gfx/ModelLawfinal.doc.
The 2004 Model Provisions were preceded by
an earlier version that is no longer available on the World Customs Organization website, but is
reproduced in Border Enforcement of Intellectual Property, Oceana Publications, Inc. (2000). Id.
The 2004 Model Provisions recommend that customs administrations raise the enforcement
standards above the TRIPS minimums. Id.
114

115 Id.
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enforcement, the WCO suggested the following as information that would assist
customs officers in readily recognizing possibly infringing goods:
* The name and business address of the importer(s) and/or consignee(s) of
the allegedly infringing goods;
* A sufficiently detailed deseription of the suspeet goods in order to make
them readily reeognisable by Customs, including a sample of the
infringing article(s),a photograph or otherlikenes;
* The country or countries of origin of the suspect goods or the country or
countries of manufacture of the allegedly infringing goods;
* The name and principal business address of each foreign person or
business entity involved in the manufacture and/or distribution of
suspect goods;
* The mode of transportation and the identity of the transporter(s) of the
allegedly infringing goods; and
* The Customs office where it is anticipated that the suspect articles will
be presented to Customs.

121

Because these data elements were the WCO's recommendation, some WTO
Member States adopted these data elements as a requirement for applications
requesting border measures. 122 The result was that IPR owners were confronted by a
process that included an insurmountable obstacle. How would IPR owners obtain the
information listed? In many cases, IPR owners would be unable to meet the
application requirements without first engaging in activities that are more
appropriate for an undercover criminal investigation, which in some countries might
be illegal. 123

Upon realizing that Member States had adopted WCO recommendations as part
of the formal procedures, the U.S.-Chile FTA attempted to incorporate language to
eliminate or clarify the TRIPS text. 124 The result is that the information required of
the IPR owner requesting border enforcement "shall not unreasonably deter recourse
to these procedures." 125 The new FTA text implies that the WCO's list of
recommended data elements is unreasonable and should not be expected from IPR
owners hoping to employ border measures as part of an overall enforcement program.
The border enforcement provisions retained the required ex offieio enforcement
authority found in the early U.S.-Jordan FTA, but expanded on this by requiring the
121 Id. at 12. Generally, these same notes appeared as a note to Article 6 in the initial set of
Model Provisions. Id.
122 See An Qinghu, Well-Known Marks & China's System Of Well-Known Mark Protection,
THE TRADEMARK REPORTER, May-June, 2005, at 754-57 (detailing China's adoption of similar
elements in its Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Customs' Protection for
Intellectual Property Rights).
123 Cf Alan S. Gutterman, The North -South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 100 (stating that enforcement is lacking in countries
where injunctive relief is not available in certain member countries).
124 See Haochen Sun, The Road To Doha And Beyond:
Some Reflections On the TRIPS
Agreement And Public Health, 15 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 123, 146 (2004) (indicating that the US-Chile
FTA modified the protection afforded in TRIPS, resulting in the highest level of protection and
enforcement standards yet achieved by an FTA).
125 U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 106, art. 17.11.17.
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border enforcement authorities to have the legal authority to exercise this power with
regard to suspected infringing goods whether they are imported, destined for export,
or moving through the country in-transit. 126 Thus, this is a major TRIPS+ provision
as it subjects exports and goods in-transit to border measures whereas the TRIPS
minimum requirement is to subject imports only to border enforcement based upon
an underlying application. 127
The criminal enforcement provisions retained the U.S.-Jordan FTA requirement
that the law enforcement authorities have ex officio authority to initiate criminal
investigations and prosecutions, i.e., without a formal complaint filed by an IPR
owner. 128 Additionally with regard to criminal enforcement, each Party must ensure
that
* Willful infringement of copyright and related rights for a commercial
advantage or financial gain is subject to criminal procedures and
penalties;
* Copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale includes the
willful infringing reproduction or distribution, including by electronic
means, copies with a significant aggregate monetary value, calculated
based on the legitimate retail value of the infringed goods;
* Remedies include imprisonment and/or monetary fines that are
sufficient to provide a deterrent to future infringements;
* Judicial authorities have the authority to order the seizure of suspected
counterfeit and pirated goods, assets legally traceable to the infringing
activity, documents and related materials, and implements that
constitute evidence of the offense;
* Items that are subject to seizure pursuant to a search order need not be
individually identified so long as they fall with in general categories
specified in the order; and
* Judicial authorities have the authority to order the forfeiture of any
assets legally traceable to the infringing activity and the destruction of
all counterfeit and pirated goods. 129
The criminal procedures and remedies have been expanded to require that the
courts have more authority and that criminal procedures and remedies extend to
encompass other assets that can be proved to be ill-gotten gains.13 0 In addition, the
FTA reduces the burden on IPR owners upon conducting an enforcement action and
seizing thousands of items because the FTA text provides that IPR owners need not
identify each individual item seized, but allows for seizure of goods that generally fall
131
within the category specified in the order.
The criminal provisions also recognize the development of the internet as a tool
used by infringers with the reference to copying and distribution by electronic

126

Id. art. 17.11.20.

127

130

TRIPS Agreement art. 51.
U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 106, art. 17.11.22(e).
d. art. 17.11.22.
Id. art. 17.11.22(c)-().

131

Id.

128
12)
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means. 132 At the time of the TRIPS negotiations, the issue of internet based criminal
33
conduct was not an issue and, therefore, not addressed. 1
The U.S.-Chile FTA, similar to the subsequent FTA with Central America that
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative signed in August 2004, provides for a
more aggressive approach to IPR enforcement and requires that the U.S.'s trading
partners actively undertake increased enforcement activity. 134

C. U.S. -South Korea FTA ("KORUS')
KORUS builds on previous FTAs and is one of the most recent IPR chapters in a
FTA. 135 Although the basic provisions appear to be the same, it is,again, worthy of
mention that FTAs do change and changes occur due to the varying negotiating
positions that different governments have with respect to specific issues.
In the civil enforcement provisions, KORUS appears to be broader in scope
regarding court costs, fees and attorney's fees.136 While the U.S.-Chile FTA provides
that the judicial authorities must have the authority to order payment of costs or fees
and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing right holder in an infringement
13 7
action involving copyright, related rights or trademark counterfeiting case,
KORUS expands on this by stating that the prevailing patent owner should also
receive reimbursement of costs or fees. 138 KORUS does instruct that the judicial
authorities must have the authority to order payment of reasonable attorney's fees to
a winning patent owner in a civil infringement case if exceptional circumstances
exist.1 3 9 However, one must bear in mind that a court that has such authority is not
required to exercise it. 140
The border measures provisions are also improved. Whereas TRIPS and most of
the previous FTAs require border measures for protection against copyright pirated
goods and trademark counterfeit goods, KORUS requires border measures to protect
against confusingly similar marks, thereby expanding the scope of protection for
trademark owners. 141 Moreover, the agreement makes clear that an application that
132

[d

1:3:3
See generallyTRIPS Agreement (neglecting to mention the Internet or the World Wide Web

because the role of the internet was relatively insignificant during 1987-1993, the time period
corresponding to the TRIPS negotiations).
131See The Dom. Rep.-Cent. Am.-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Statement of Administrative
Action,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Transmittal/asset -upload -file816 7
815.pdf. The Central American countries are Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
Id.
135 Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 24.6, June 30, 2007,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Republic of KoreaFTA/FinalText/Section-Index.
html [hereinafter KORUS FTA]. The U.S. and the Republic of Korea both signed the agreement,
however, the agreement has not been acted upon by the U.S. Congress. Id.
1:36See id. art. 18.10.7 (obligating the losing party to pay the winning party's court costs,
attorney and other fees).
137 U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 106, art. 17.11.10.
138 KORUS FTA, supranote 135, art. 18.10.7.
139 Id.
140

Id.

141

Id. art. 18.10.19.
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is accepted shall apply to all points of entry to its territory, i.e., have national
effect. 142
The criminal procedures and remedies are also broader in scope. KORUS
obligates both governments to apply criminal procedures and penalties even absent
willful counterfeiting and piracy if there is knowing trafficking in counterfeit or illicit
labels and counterfeit documentation or packaging. 143 Criminal penalties must also
be available to be applied "against any person who, without authorization, knowingly
uses or attempts to use an audiovisual recording device to transmit or make a copy of
the motion picture or other audiovisual work from a performance of the motion
144
picture or other audiovisual work in a public motion picture exhibition facility."
A lengthy provision is included regarding the liability of internet service
providers, 145 which builds on the provisions that are also included in the U.S.-Chile
FTA. 146 Because of the developments related to copyright infringement on the
internet occurring in the post-TRIPS years, these extensive provisions attempt to
give copyright owners measures to protect content, but to balance the protections by
including some limitations on liability for service providers. 147
The challenges of the internet related to online infringement also prompted the
inclusion of a letter as part of the IPR enforcement commitment. The June 30, 2007
letter to the U.S. Trade Representative obligates South Korea to take criminal
enforcement actions to shut down internet sites that permit unauthorized
downloading of copyrighted works and increased efforts to shut down peer-to-peer
services. 148
KORUS continues to build upon prior FTAs and includes numerous provisions
that provide for stronger IPR enforcement. In an April 2007 report to the Bush
Administration and the U.S. Congress, the Industry-Trade Advisory Committee for
Intellectual Property stated that the KORUS intellectual property provisions are
149
very supportive of the IPR chapter in the agreement.

IV. FTAS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE-HIGH DEMAND, LIMITED RESOURCES
The "success" of the FTAs concluded by the United States is that higher IPR
enforcement standards have become the norm. There have been clarifications of
TRIPS provisions and expansion of the scope of protection to address developments
in the post-TRIPS period. 150
142

Id,

'13Id.art.
144
145
116
147
148

18.10.28.

Id.art. 18.10.29.
Id. art. 18.10.30.
U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 106, art. 17.11.23.
KORUS FTA, supranote 136, art. 18.10.30(a)(ii).
Id. art. 18.Confirmation Letter (Online Piracy Prevention).

19 Report of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights 2 (April

27, 2007),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Republic of KoreaFTA/Reports/assetuplo
ad file196_12780.pdf.
150 Sanders, supra note 87, at 897-99 (discussing inclusion of TRIPS-plus provisions in free
trade agreements and indicating that the United States negotiates high levels of protection for
international intellectual property rights).
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The heightened levels of required IPR enforcement are accompanied by the same
technical assistance challenges that existed at the time that TRIPS was agreed to
and entered into force. 151 The extreme challenge of providing adequate assistance
arises from some unspoken realities.
First, when one looks at the FTAs concluded by the U.S. or bilateral FTAs and
EPAs concluded between other governments, 152 are there IPR enforcement
obligations being imposed on trading partners who had failed to implement
effectively their TRIPS obligations and are now expected to meet TRIPS+ standards?
Second, if there was inadequate technical assistance to help developing and least
developed countries to meet their TRIPS obligations during the TRIPS transition
periods, how will additional transition periods in FTAs/EPAs help countries reach
TRIPS+ enforcement levels absent increased technical assistance resources?
Third, what human and monetary resource commitments are being made
explicitly by the governments/industries that seek higher enforcement standards so
that future disputes over the IPR obligations can be averted?
Finally, taking into consideration the current state of IPR enforcement in a
developing country (not yet providing TRIPS level enforcement effectively) and the
new TRIPS+ standards required by an FTA or EPA, how does widening the gap that
must be bridged improve IPR enforcement?
Essentially, what has occurred is a successful effort by various industries to get
some governments to negotiate high IPR enforcement standards. The technical
assistance issue is a real problem that has not been satisfactorily confronted. For
some governments that had practically no national IPR enforcement systems in
place, they have agreed to TRIPS+ enforcement regimes that are complicated and
153
require significant resources.
As illustrated by the few examples above, the civil enforcement systems have
had additional elements added in order to provide better civil enforcement
mechanisms for IPR owners. 154 The additional elements impose increased duties on
the court systems of these countries. 155 Moreover, expanded protections for different
forms of IPR means that there will be more complicated legal challenges before the
courts, which requires increased training for judges on various complex IPR issues so
15'
TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 21, § 1:2; Christine Thelen, Comment, CarrotsAnd Sticks.*
Evaluating The Tools For Securing Successful TIPS Implementation, 24 TEMP. J. SC. TECH. &
ENVTL. L. 519, 525 (2005). Although the term "capacity building" is now popular to use in place of
"technical assistance," the older term will be used. See, e.g., id.
152 Kristy L. Balsanek et. al., InternationalLegal Development In Review.* 2005 Business
Regulation, 40 INT'L LAW. 217, 222 (2006). The Japan-Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement
reached in 2006, obligates the Philippines to extend border enforcement to patents, utility models
and industrial designs and to provide criminal penalties for all IPRs. JAPAN MINISTRY OF ECONOMY
TRADE AND INDUSTRY, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS WITH TRADE

AGREEMENTS 597 (2007), available at www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/2007WTO/34IntellectualProperty.pdf.
153 Se TRIPS Agreement arts. 65-66 (providing transitional periods for developing and least
developed countries, who did not have or merely had limited IPR enforcement mechanisms at the
time TRIPS was enacted).
154

See, e.g., Julia Cheng, China's Copyright System: Rising To The Spirit of TRIPS Requires

An InternalFocus And WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1941, 1988 (1998) (indicating the
additional mechanisms that courts in China developed in order to provide an adequate civil
enforcement system for intellectual property rights).
155 Id.
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that the courts can properly consider the various issues and issue well-reasoned
decisions.
For judicial systems that require judges to hear cases in numerous legal areas,
the IPR area has grown increasingly complicated because of the internet and
scientific areas. 156 The pressures on the judiciary will require constant training in
technical areas because of the increasingly technical issues arising in IPR cases.
Thus, even in countries that have judicial training centers, they require constant
upgrading in training and education content. The question is whether there are
sufficient resources for this to occur and to what extent have developed countries
committed to an ongoing program of assistance while a country's judiciary works to
reach a minimum level of competence in IPR.
Turning to the enforcement authorities, police and prosecutors may be able to
take their criminal investigative and prosecutorial experiences and apply them to
criminal IPR cases, but they will still need to understand the fundamental IPR issues
and what constitutes criminal conduct. 157 Unlike "traditional" crimes such as assault
with a weapon, bank robbery, and other such crimes, IPR crimes may not be as
obvious given the type of conduct that constitutes criminal conduct. Therefore,
prosecutors and police will need training to understand the conduct that rises to the
level of a crime. In addition, the constant improvements in technology have shown
the adaptability of IPR infringers to use new technologies to commit IPR crimes,
which means that the technical assistance program should be a long-term
commitment that will require significant funding. 158 It is important to remind the
international community that an international standard mandating criminal
enforcement of any forms of IPR occurred for the first time in TRIPS, which is still a
recent development. 159
In view of the rather recent developments regarding the criminalization of IPRrelated conduct, it should not come as a surprise that many developing countries
have had problems, first, in creating new IPR crimes and, second, putting into
'56 See, e.g., David Ludwig, Shooting the Messenger: ISP Liabilityfor Contributory Copyright
Infringement, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 478, 478 (2006) (stating that the Digital

Millennium Copyright Act's purpose was to strengthen copyright protection).
157 See Graeme W. Austin , Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights:
Choice of Law in
Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 22 (1999). The
Internet causes a difficulty of the choice of law with many international courts. Id. Thus, one
country's courts may be dictating the law in another country. Id.
158 C. Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement.* BitTorrent as a
Vehicle for Estabhlisnng a New Copyright Definition for Staple Articles of Commerce, 40 COLUM.

J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 36-37 (2006) (concluding that there should be an initiative to aid industries
with new technologies, instead of having these technologies destroy these industries with copyright
infringement).
159Maureen Walterbach, International Illicit Convergence:
The Growing Problem Of

TransnationalOrganized Crime Groups'InvolvemontIn InteelectualPropertyRights Violations, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 608-09 (indicating the threat posed to organized crime's intellectual
property right violations due to criminal enforcement provisions included in TRIPS). By way of
comparison, Section 2319 of the Criminal Infringement of Copyright, was made part of Title 18,
United States Code, in 1982, only a dozen years before the signing of the agreements creating the
WTO and TRIPS. Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat.
91 (1982). Section 2320 of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, was made part of Title 18, United
States Code, in 1984. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502(a), 98 Stat.
1837 (1984).
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practice the criminal enforcement activities that have to be undertaken by police,
prosecutors and the courts. 160 Adding to the basic challenge of creating a criminal
IPR enforcement system is the fact that there are no permanent on-the-ground
technical assistance teams that stay with any country's criminal enforcement teams
for extended periods of time, e.g., six to twelve months.
The expanded scope of border enforcement measures to include exports and
goods in-transit will also add to the technical assistance needs. 161 More importantly,
the expansion requires an increased level of government-industry cooperation in
order for border enforcement authorities to learn more about IPR and maintain
information about ways to detect suspect goods. 162 The increased responsibilities at
the border highlight the necessity of an internal system so that customs offices can
communicate through information dissemination regarding specific IPRs. Thus, not
only are border enforcement authorities in need of basic IPR training regarding the
different types of IPR, but also about ways to develop and maintain a database of
IPRs as well as a database that includes information about importers, shippers, and
other "persons" who are found to be involved in the import and export of infringing
goods. 163
Essentially, the FTAs have raised the enforcement bar as it relates to civil,
criminal and border enforcement. 164 Along with the increased levels of enforcement,
there is likely to be an expectation by IPR owners that they will receive heightened
levels of enforcement as the FTAs intend. While the IPR owning community may
have some patience as developing countries work to improve their enforcement
systems, the past teaches that patience is limited. Thus, the question that should be
at the center is whether the governments and IPR industries that expect to receive
the benefits of increased levels of enforcement can provide the necessary technical
assistance that will help developing governments deliver on the promises made.
In blunt terms, one must question why developing countries are expected to
meet their TRIPS+ obligations, even with the benefit of transition periods, when they
had not been providing TRIPS level enforcement at the time of committing to
TRIPS+. There is little to indicate that the type or form of technical assistance that
will be provided is any different from past practice and, looking back, it is apparent

160 Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Properity Systems And Investment Stimulation: The
Rating Of Systems In Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 288, 291, 293, 295, 298-99, 301,
304, 306-07, 309-10, 312, 314-16, 318-19, 322, 325-26, 329, 331-32, 337, 341 (1997) (detailing the
civil enforcement systems for intellectual property rights, and challenges facing enforcement
authorities in eighteen countries, including Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, South Korea, and Uruguay).
161 See Kearston G. Everitt, The Latin American Musician's "Life Would Be Meaningless
Without Music': The FightAgainst CD PiracyIn Latin America, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 495, 525-26
(2005) (detailing technical assistance needs of Latin American countries regarding border
enforcement measures as well as attempts to improve border enforcement procedures).
162 Id.
163

See Maria Nelson, Michelle Vizurraga, & David Chang, Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A

Worldwide Problem, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 1068, 1088 (2006) (discussing improvements in customs
procedures enacted in the European Union in February, 2005).
104 See Yu, supra note 6, at 866-67 (explaining the implications of TRIPS+ agreements in
FTAs).
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that the resources available were not sufficient given the continuing complaints of
high rates of JPR infringement. 165

V. BEYOND FTAs-ACTA
In October 2007, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that negotiations on
an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA") would begin and include the
United States, European Union, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand
and Switzerland. 166 Why an ACTA? The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
made clear in announcing the launch of the ACTA initiative that it will not involve
any changes to TRIPS. 167 "Rather, the goal is to set a new, higher benchmark for
enforcement that countries can join on a voluntary basis." 168 "The negotiations
represent a cooperative effort by the governments involved, and will not be conducted
169
as part of any international organization."
The Government of New Zealand provides some of the reasons for pursuing
ACTA:
The proliferation of infringements of intellectual property rights
("IPR") particularly in the context of counterfeiting and piracy poses an
ever-increasing threat to the sustainable development of the world
economy. The consequences of such IPR infringements include (1)depriving
legitimate businesses and their workers of income; (2) discouraging
innovation and creativity; (3) threatening consumer health and safety; (4)
providing an easy source of revenue for organized crime; and (5) loss of tax
170
revenue.
The Government of New Zealand adds that the goals of ACTA are to:
Establish, among nations committed to strong IPR protection, a common
standard for IPR enforcement to combat global infringements of IPR
particularly in the context of counterfeiting and piracy that addresses
today's challenges, in terms of increasing international cooperation,
strengthening the framework of practices that contribute to effective

165 Id. at 866-70 (indicating that many developing countries were still determining how they
could achieve compliance under the minimum TRIPS requirements when developed countries began
utilizing agreements with more stringent requirements).
166Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Will Seek Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (Oct. 23, 2007), availableat
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2007/October/Ambassador -Schwab -Announ
ces US Will SeekNewTradeAgreement toFightFakes.html [hereinafter Press Release on
ACTA]; European Comm'n, Sectoral Trade Issues on Intellectual Property (Oct. 23, 2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/intell-property/pr231007_en.htm.
107 Press Release on ACTA, supra note 166.
168 Id.
169Id.
170 Ministry of Econ. Dev. of N.Z., Information Sheet: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC
34358.aspx.
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The number of countries that are participating in the discussions has increased
since the initial October 2007 announcement and by August 2008 the additional
governments included Australia, Morocco and Singapore. 172 Although the actual
details of the July 2008 meetings were not disclosed, the U.S. Trade Representative's
Office did provide a summary indicating that meeting participants discussed civil
remedies for infringements of intellectual property rights, including the availability
1 73
of preliminary measures, preservation of evidence, damages, legal fees, and costs.

They also continued their previous discussions of border enforcement. 174
From the perspective of the United States, it has FTAs with Australia, Morocco
and Singapore. 175 The three FTAs include significant IPR provisions, many that are
similar to those discussed above. The United States is also a Party to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, 176 but the IPR
enforcement provisions of NAFTA track closely to TRIPS. 177
Canada and Mexico have come under strong industry criticism concerning their
IPR enforcement regimes. In February 2008, the International Intellectual Property
Alliance ("IIPA"), in its Special 301 submission to the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, recommended that Canada be designated as a Priority Watch List
country because Canada has taken no meaningful steps to modernize its copyright
law, has an ineffective border enforcement system and insufficient enforcement
resources. 178 Regarding Mexico, the 1IPA stated that at the macro level copyright
piracy levels remain high and there is no deterrent effect in curtailing the pervasive
economic crime of piracy. 179
Going forward in the negotiations, it will be interesting to monitor
developments. Given the ACTA's focus on IPR enforcement, USTR's annual report,

171Id.

Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Statement from Spokesperson Scott Elmore on
ACTA 1 (Aug.1,2008), avnilnhle at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2008/August/asset-upload-file308-l5
055.pdf.
172

173 Id,

17IId.

175 Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco -FTA/FInal-Text/Section-Index.html;
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Austi., May 18, 2004,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Australia -FTA/Final -Text/asset-upload-file
148_5168.pdf; Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/Final-Texts/asset-upload-fi
e708_4036.pdf.

176 NAFTA, supra note 86, pmbl.
177
Id. art 102.1(d).
178 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Special 301 Report: Canada, Int'l Intellectual
Prop. Alliance 8 (Feb. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2008/2008SPEC301CANADA.pdf.
179 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Special 301 Report: Mexico, Int'l Intellectual
Prop. Alliance 51 (Feb. 11, 2008), availahble at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2008/2008SPEC301MEXICO.pdf.
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i.e., Special 301,180 is insightful as to some of the challenges that may face the
governments participating in the negotiations. For example, USTR has reported that
Mexico should increase border enforcement efforts and pass legislation that
18 1
empowers law enforcement and customs to take ex officio enforcement actions.
Concerning Canada, USTR stated that Canada should improve its enforcement
system to enable authorities to take effective action against the trade in counterfeit
and pirated products as well as curb the volume of infringing goods that are
transshipped and transiting Canada, identifying its weak border enforcement and
182
need for stronger legislation to empower customs.
In view of the USTR annual report, which is based, in part, on the experiences of
IPR owners doing business in foreign countries and, therefore, reflects what obstacles
exist, can an improved enforcement system be provided within a year or two years
after an agreement is formally reached? Given the fact that the TRIPS enforcement
obligations went into effect in some of these countries on January 1, 1996,183 and
there are still fundamental problems in enforcement systems among the ACTA
negotiating countries, IPR owners would be prudent to temper their expectations.
Moreover, the question needs to be asked, how far are the governments willing
to go to strengthen criminal IPR provisions. As recently as May 2008, the European
Commission's Commissioner for the Internal Market ruled out the possibility of new
legislation to combat piracy. 184
Thus, the ACTA discussions may involve more negotiating than the parties
expected at the outset. In view of the IPR enforcement provisions found in FTAs
concluded between the United States and its trading partners, and especially the
more recently concluded FTAs, the question is: Whether ACTA will contain
aggressive enforcement text that mirrors the U.S. FTAs or something less?
Finally, it is important to be reminded that ACTA is an initiative that allows
governments to voluntarily commit themselves to whatever TRIPS+ standards are
agreed.18 5 This raises the old question concerning technical assistance and to what
degree are the developed countries committing resources to assist developing
countries that voluntarily submit to new enforcement standards. If ACTA is to be
meaningful and welcoming to developing countries (or developed countries that are
having implementation problems) that voluntarily agree to new and higher
standards, there must be an assistance program that is better developed than what
has been available in the past.
Developing countries that wish to be a part of ACTA and commit to higher
enforcement standards may need significant assistance in all aspects of
180 See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (2006) (requiring the U.S. Trade Representative to submit a report
to Congress that identifies countries that deny adequate and effective IPR protection). Special 301
reports are available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeSectors/IntellectualProperty/Section-Index.html.
181 2008 USTR SPEC.
301
REP. 43 [hereinafter
2008 301-REP.],
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2008/2008-Special-301-Report/
asset upload file553_14869.pdf.
182 Id. at 39.
183 See TRIPS Agreement, art. 1
184 See Nikki Tait, EU to Rule Out New PiracyLaws,FIN. TIMES (London), May 13, 2008, at 5.
185 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Fact Sheet:
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade

Agreement 1 (Oct. 23,2007), available at
http://ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2007/assetupload-filel22_13414.pdf
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enforcement. 186 Thus, while ACTA may look inviting for some developing countries
to be part of this effort, technical assistance shortcomings of the past with regard to
assistance in helping willing developing countries should be avoided by an upfront
commitment to provide more resources than has been available in the past. There is
a need for training teams made up of people with different areas of expertise able to
be on the ground in countries for extended periods of time in order to assist in
187
implementation of day-to-day enforcement activities.
As always, translating words in an agreement into action is a formidable task.
The past dozen years of experience with TRIPS should be a constant reminder of this
difficulty and the consequences of failing to devote resources to assistance.

VI. COUNTERFEITING-PIRACY: THE TRAINING/EDUCATION/AWARENESS DILEMMA
One reference to the current state of global counterfeiting and piracy is that it is
spiraling out of control.188 In its annual report, the U.S. Trade Representative's
Office reported that the continuing growth in IPR theft and trade in fakes and
pirated materials threatens innovative and creative economies worldwide. 18 9 As a
result, stronger and more effective criminal and border enforcement is required to
stop the manufacture, import, export, transit, and distribution of pirate and
counterfeit goods. 190 The office of the Australian Minister of Trade indicated that
Australia would join the ACTA negotiations because the negative impacts of the
counterfeit and pirate trade are wide-ranging, creating significant costs for
governments, consumers and businesses. 191
From an industry perspective, the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC")
has:
[Riecommended that G819 2 ministers commit the resources and political
direction necessary for the Heiligendamm Process to work effectively
against intellectual property theft and facilitate innovation and economic
development. The Heiligendamm Process was established at... [the 2007]
186 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Fact Sheet:
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement
3 (Aug. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter
Aug. 4-Press Release],
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2008/asset-upload-file760-1508
4.pdf
187 See Yu, supranote 6, at 847.
188 Charlie McCreevy, European Comm'r for Internal Market and Servs., Speech 08/237 at
Conference on Counterfeiting and Piracy (May 13, 2008) (transcript available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/237&format=HTML&aged=0
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en); see The 2008 High Level Conf. on Counterfeiting and Privacy,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/iprenforcement/index-en.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
189 2008 301-REP., supra note 181, at 6.
190Id.

191 Austl. Minister for Trade, Australia to Negotiate an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(February 1, 2008), http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2008/sc_012.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2008).
192 G8 Members, http://www.g8.gc.ca/members-en.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2008) (stating that
the G8 is made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom,
and the United States).
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G8 Summit in Germany to address the issues of product counterfeiting and
copyright piracy." 193
The ICC has stated that "While we're pleased that protection of intellectual property
rights will be tabled in Japan, we're just not seeing the political attention warranted
194
by a problem of this global scale."
The number of IPR enforcement training programs that are delivered globally is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to monitor because there are many and they are
provided by numerous different governments, intergovernmental organizations, and
industry groups. 195 One effort to capture this activity is the U.S. State Department's
IPR training database. 196 For an example of European Union Activity, IPR related
assistance programs are included in a list that identifies programs under the EUASEAN Technical Assistance ECAP 11.197 The World Customs Organization makes a
brief reference to its efforts in describing its IPR program. 198
INTERPOL's
involvement began in 2000 and has steadily increased its activity regarding training
and other efforts. 199
Generally, there has been a great emphasis on IPR enforcement training since
the creation of the WTO. To a large extent, it seemed reasonable to focus on IPR
enforcement training because of the requirements to create national IPR enforcement
systems that complied with the enforcement elements as outlined in TRIPS.
In view of some of statements being made today by governments, industry
representatives, and intergovernmental organizations that the problem of IPR crimes
continues to grow, it would seem to suggest that the IPR enforcement training
strategy employed since 1995 needs to be reassessed. At a time when the TRIPS
enforcement provisions are ineffectively implemented by many governments, 20 0 when
some governments are committing to TRIPS+ standards, despite their inability to
provide TRIPS level enforcement, 20 1 and an ACTA is being negotiated, why should

193 Int'l Chamber of Commerce, ICC targets ministers to advance IP protection at G8 summit
(June 6, 2008), http://www.iccwbo.org/bascap/icccbcee/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).

194

[Hd

195 2004 USTR. SPEC.
301
REP. 4
[hereinafter
2004 301-REP.],
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2004/2004-Special-301/asset-u
pload file963 5996.pdlht= (noting the several agencies within the U.S. government that provide
"technical assistance and training" on the implementation of TRIPS and other international IP
agreements).
196Se Intellectual Property Rights Training Program Database, http://www.training.ipr.gov/
(last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
197 See List of All Activities and Events, http://www.ecap-project.org/activitiesevents.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2008).
198 See WCO Responsibilities,
http://www.wcoomd.org/home-wco-topics-epoverviewboxes-responsibilities-epipr.htm
(last visited
Oct. 26, 2008).
199 See INTERPOL Intellectual Property Crime,
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/IntellectualProperty/Default.asp (last visited Oct. 26,
2008).
200 2004 301-REP., supra note 195, at 2.
201 2007 USTR ANN. CHINA REP. 6, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2007/asset-upload-file625-1369
2.pdf.
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IPR owners expect that there will be significant improvements in IPR enforcement
results?
Since 1995, there has been an unending wave of workshops, seminars and
conferences addressing IPR enforcement around the world, but there has also been a
constant chorus of complaints from the IPR industries and owners that IPR
enforcement is inadequate. 20 2 Some of the possible explanations for this are:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

those delivering the training may be ineffective;
a. Lack sufficient experience/expertise, and
b. Utilize ineffective training formats;
the content of the training is deficient or inadequate;
the people attending are not the "right" people to receive the training:
the people attending have no interest in IPR enforcement; and
insufficient time committed to specific country deficiencies.

There are many potential reasons for ineffective IPR enforcement systems,
including issues such as the lack of political will or corruption. 20 3 Nevertheless, there
must be some serious assessments made to consider what fundamental changes may
be necessary to make IPR training and education more effective. The statements
issued by governments, industry representatives, and others would suggest that,
fundamentally, something needs to change because the training that has been
provided is not having the desired effect.
While IPR enforcement is important, how have training programs demonstrated
and shown the link between IPR enforcement and economic development in
developing and least developed countries? Or, have there been serious and sustained
attempts to provide IPR training that emphasize the important role of IPR
recognition and use to generate business revenues and, thereby, contribute to local
governments and economies? Has the idea of IPR enforcement as a tool for economic
development been simply stated, but not shown and demonstrated?
Has the IPR community over-emphasized enforcement to its own detriment?
Has the IPR community failed to project an image of wanting to be helpful to all
potential beneficiaries, not just a select few industries from developed countries?
After a dozen years, has the IPR community tainted itself with a perceived overemphasis on enforcement and lack of programs that demonstrate the more positive
aspects of IPR?
Another issue that must be considered is the target of all this IPR enforcement
training. While it is obvious that IPR enforcement training is necessary for police,
202 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Expands Outreach in Campaign
to STOP! Trade in fakes (June 6. 2005), availableat
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2005/June/US-Exps-Outreach-in
-Campaign-toSTOP! Trade in Fakes.html (stating that in June 2005, several officials from U.S.
Government agencies traveled to Europe to meet with officials from Germany, UK, France and other

European nations to address strategies for improving IPR enforcement strategy in the form of a

crackdown on global piracy and counterfeiting).
203 2003 USTR SPEC. 301 REP. 10, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2003/2003-Special-301 -Report/
asset upload file665_6124.pdf (discussing the political corruption influence on IPR enforcement in
China).
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prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and any other government agency officials
involved in IPR enforcement, a focus on government agencies and officials overlooks
and ignores a country's IPR generating sectors. 20 4 To generate a greater respect and
appreciation for IPR protection and enforcement, it may be necessary to spend as
much time with college-aged students, business groups, and others from the private
sector in order to demonstrate how pervasive IPR can be in practically any endeavor
that is pursued and, thus, the relationship between IPR creation, the need to
consider protection and how enforcement contributes to generating increased
revenues in the long term.
IPR enforcement training and education that is provided in a vacuum, without
demonstrating its role in an IPR/commercial/economic system, is lost on those who
can not appreciate its potential value. Indeed, the government's IPR enforcement
authorities may never appreciate the linkage because they have never or will never
be creators and entrepreneurs who will have any direct benefits from IPR.

CONCLUSION
The IPR enforcement issue and how it is to be pursued in the future needs to be
re-examined.
Although ACTA seeks to raise minimum IPR enforcement
standards, 20 5 it is an initiative that is, generally, one involving developed
countries. 20 6 If the 2006 WTO TRIPS Council meeting is an indicator that there is a
divide between developed and developing countries on this issue, then it appears that
new approaches to the IPR enforcement issue need to be added to existing training
20 7
and education efforts.

204 See Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep., Remarks on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2
(Oct. 23, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Transcripts/2007/October/asset-upload-file 11013428
.pdf) (noting that those with jobs in sectors such as software, pharmaceuticals, movies, music and
literature "depend on strong intellectual property protection").
205 Aug. 4-Press Release, supra note 186, at 1 (indicating the goal of the ACTA effort is to
strengthen legal frameworks, enforcement, and cooperation initiatives regarding intellectual
property rights).
206 Id. at 2 (indicating participants in the first round of negotiations as including Australia,
Canada, EU, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, the
United Arab Emirates and the United States).
207 See TRIPS Council DiscussionsFall Apart Over Enforcement Issue, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG., Nov. 1, 2006, at 1, http://ictsd.net/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweeklylO-36.pdf. At
the TRIPS Council meeting, developing countries opposed the European Union's ("EU") initiative to
introduce the enforcement topic in the Council, arguing that this was an issue subject to domestic
jurisdictions alone. Id. "The EU highlighted the need for intervention from the TRIPS Council to
assist efforts to curb the rapid increase in piracy and counterfeiting world wide." Id. While the EU
recognized that WTO Members are allowed to implement enforcement provisions domestically, it felt
that such measures must ultimately help to achieve the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement. Id. at
1-2. "The EU has previously submitted a paper suggesting that the Council should assess Members'
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement's enforcement provisions." Id. at 2. Several developing
countries, including China, Chile, India, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, strongly opposed the
initiative and objected to a presentation by the EU on its experiences, which they felt would amount
to implicitly accepting the EU's proposal to share country experiences. Id. The developing countries
felt that enforcement was an issue outside the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. Id.
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As we move toward nearly a decade and a half of IPR enforcement training that
has not achieved the desired effect, it should be clear that JPR enforcement needs
new and fresh approaches. This is not to say that existing content needs to be
eliminated, but it may be time to press the "refresh" key so that something new and
different can be added.
It is a difficult task to clarify ambiguities of existing standards and to raise
minimum levels of IPR enforcement when IPR education programs do not adequately
expand to include potential local beneficiaries. 20 8 IPR enforcement training and
education, which is a complex task, needs to have sufficient flexibility in content so
that there is something demonstrable that links the enforcement to business and
economic development.
Finally, those involved in training and education should consider greater use of
today's technologies in reaching out to more people and beyond the usual
enforcement community. Looking at IPR enforcement training and education in its
broadest sense, some progress in attaining higher levels of protection and education
may occur if more local beneficiaries in developing and least developed countries are
convinced to become proponents of IPR protection and enforcement because they
understand how IPR can be "practiced" through use of these concepts in their day-to20 9
day commercial activities.
Thus, while efforts at clarifying existing IPR requirements and raising
standards are worthy objectives, the fact that governments and IPR owners continue
to see a worsening situation is indicative of a need for reassessment of IPR
enforcement training programs. After years of repeating the notion that IPR
enforcement contributes to economic development, it may be time to restate the idea
in order to focus on demonstrating that the use and application of intellectual
property concepts should generate value to a company, the local economy in which it
operates and, thereby, necessitate protection and enforcement. 210 The need is to
emphasize that IPR is important in and of itself.

208

Soo TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 21, § 1:2 (discussing the difficulty in educating the local

customs officials on how to protect intellectual property); see also Ruth L. Okediji, The Ins titutions
of IntellectualProperty: New Trends in an Old Debate, 98 Am.SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 219, 221 (2004)
(discussing the impact of TRIPS on the ability of developing countries to ensure the welfare of their
citizens).
209 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting.* The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
InternationalIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2004) (stating that the
proponents of TRIPS argue that strong intellectual property rules are essential to a country's
economic growth and development); see also Thelen, supra note 151, at 528 ('[C]arrots' dangled
by... developed nations would be significant motivators for developing countries to comply with the
TRIPS agreement. These positive incentives focus on providing support in the implementation of
TRIPS through technical assistance and additional time to become compliant as well as creating
short and long-term economic incentives.").
210 Helfer, supra note 209, at 2-3 (stating that the proponents of TRIPS argue that strong
intellectual property rules are essential to a country's economic growth and development). For
further reading, the reader should review www.galaxysystemsinc.com for a new initiative and IPR
tool that attempts to inject "fun" into IPR learning.

